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ABSTRACT
The concept of coalition is central to classic and recent organizational
theory (e.g. Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967).
This paper focuses on the process of forming an organizational coalition
and uses current research and theory on coalition behavior (Murnighan, 1978a)
to predict the consequences of this process for organizations and the people
who inhabit them. We consider first the structural contingencies that
inevitably influence both the process and the outcomes of coalition. Then
we address the organizational coalition formation process, and explore some
of its consequences.
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ORGANIZATIONAL COALITION FORMATION: PROCESS, CONSEQUENCES,
AND DOMINANT COALITIONS
The concept of coalition is central to classic and recent organi-
zational theory (e.g. Mintzberg, 1983: Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978:
Thompson, 1967). This paper focuses on the process of forming an
organizational coalition and uses current research and theory on
coalition behavior (Murnighan, 1978a) to predict the consequences of
this process for organizations and the people who inhabit them. We
consider first the structural contingencies that inevitably influence
both the process and the outcomes of coalition. Then we address the
organizational coalition formation process, and explore some of its
consequences
.
Almost everyone has experienced organizational coalitions, however
briefly: two executive vice presidents coordinate their budget recom-
mendations, sabotaging the proposals of a third VP; a subset of the
secretaries in a steno pool plan a surprise birthday party for another
secretary, deflating the independent celebration plans of one of the
more isolated secretaries in the office; three members of a work team
coordinate their activities and present the procedures they prefer to
other work group members as a fait accompli. None of these coalitions
are unusual: they are all part of the ever-changing interpersonal
networds that determine the informal structure of an organization.
They all result from a coalition formation process, and this process
affects a variety of organizational and personal outcomes.
A Basic Assumption
We assume, first of all, that most organizational coalition for-
mation follows the same basic process: individual rather than
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collective action is the driving force. Essentially, one individual
contacts another: coalitions form by an accumulation of
interconnecting dyads . One secretary mentions to another that one of
their colleagues will soon have a birthday, and they should do
something about it. She also contacts other members of the secre-
tarial group, also one at a time (for the most part). Members of the
coalition who have already joined recruit other members. In this way,
a coalition of disparate membership emerges: the goals of the members
are not unitary (White, 1974), their roles in this coalition are not
exactly complimentary, and the coalition may be particularly unstable
(cf. Schelling, 1978).
Unlike the conceptualizations of many current theories of coali-
tion behavior, instability seems appropriate for organizational coali-
tions. The secretaries in our example will probably disband their
coalition after the birthday celebration. Indeed, their coalition was
strictly informal; even if it endured, its membership would almost
certainly charge, if only to add the birthday celebrant. Other issues
may provoke the formation of alternative coalitions and the originator
of the birthday coalition may be far less inclined to act forcefully
on other agenda. She may not even be needed or approached if, for
example, a coalition forms to confront superiors and demand relaxed
working hours.
The concept of organization coalitions, then, is problematic:
they are fleeting collectives whose membership is difficult to specify.
They are not formalized groups that collectively embrace a wide
variety of issues, although this is certainly possible. Work teams
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and long-term committees, for example, are formal, relatively per-
manent coalitions. Within work groups and committees, however, infor-
mal coalitions form and reform frequently.. This paper concentrates on
these informal, non-autocratic groupings. In addition, organizations
and organizational units only rarely operate as dictatorships:
Democracy is too ingrained (at least in the West) for supervisors to
completely ignore the preferences of their colleagues. Thus, coali-
tions are a necessity. Instead of providing ways to identify coali-
tion members, then, we hope in this paper to promote a better
understanding of some of the unexpected outcomes that necessarily
accompany the formation of organizational coalitions.
Coalition Formation
The coalition formation process is this paper's basic foundation.
In the Social Psychology of Organizing (1969), Karl Weick discusses a
system of ever-expanding, interconnected coalitions that create enough
power for two people to make a decision for an entire group of seven-
teen. The two people meet (similar to our basic assumption) and
decide to vote as a bloc. They recruit another group member and
decide that, among the three of them, they will determine everyone's
vote in the large group by majority rule. The original two are enough
for a majority among the three: the three will now vote together,
regardless of the third individual's original preference. They add
two more people and repeat the process, resulting in the three being
the majority for the group of five and the five ultimately voting
alike. Finally they add four more people, repeat the process, and
establish a nine-person coalition that votes identically in the large
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meeting. They are a majority of nine in the group of seventeen, and
the ultimate decision thus becomes the alternative chosen by the orig-
inal two. The other members of the nine-person majority coalition
may have initially joined to increase their power within the entire
group (e.g., one vote in nine is better than one in seventeen), but
they would be very upset if they learned of the duplicity of the orig-
inal two.
This process would "work" - the two original members would suc-
cessfully control the large group's decision - only in an environment
where group and organizational members were uninformed about who saw
whom and what was discussed within the organization. Indeed, getting
the third, fourth and fifth members to vote with the original two in
their subsequent preliminary votes is possible only if these three are
very gullible and lack any ability to analyze and interpret what is
happening. This seems to be too much to assume. Alternatively, our
treatment of the organizational coalition process assumes that infor-
mation, even incomplete information, is readily available and usable
by organizational members, making this expanding coalition process
essentially infeasible (and suicidal). In addition, we assume that
organizational members will be reasonably aware of their own interests
and will attempt to further them whenever possible, to the best of
their abilities. These assumptions, concerning information and
people's desire to do well, fit nicely with the basic assumptions of
most coalition theories, that people are informed and attempt to maxi-
mize their outcomes.
Game theory also assumes that, if an optimal strategy exists, a
rational player should find it. We assume that organizational members
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will do their strategic best, even if this falls short of the optimal.
(As we will see, few coalition situations, even theoretically, provide
the opportunity for optimal strategies.) Given a lack of perfect
information, this is another seemingly reasonable approximation.
Our analysis diverges most seriously from the basic tenets of
coalition theory in our attempt to deal with a dynamic environment.
Coalition theories, with few exceptions (Komorita, 1979; Kororita and
Chertkoff, 1973), are static models. Some instability among the
coalitions is expected, but the coalition situation (i.e., rules,
structure, etc.) is not expected to change. Altering* the game (the
rules governing the strategic interaction of the actors involved)
would strain the theories' assumption of perfect information and
complicate the currently complex models beyond their present capabili-
ties. Thus, in applying static models to an obviously dynamic
situation, we may make potentially erroneous predictions. Nevertheless,
as most theories only rarely fit exactly the circumstances in which
they are used, our hope is that the ideas generated by these static
models and the research that has tested them will have some validity
in dynamic organizational environments.
The Dominant Coalition
Since Thompson (1967), organizational theorists have concentrated
on the dominant coalition, that group of individuals who most fre-
quently direct the organization. Our treatment of organizational
coalitions will include the concept of dominant coalition, but only
among many organizational coalitions. As mentioned, coalitions
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among secretaries and among the blue collar personnel of an organiza-
tion also act in concerted ways. Our analysis will not include
interorganizat ional coalitions, but will be restricted to intraorgani-
zational interactions and negotiations, primarily for the sake of bre-
vity and simplicity. Many of our contentions may general-ize to
interorganizat ional coalitions, but those extensions await further
treatment.
Resources
Organizational coalitions form to preserve or increase the
resources of the coalition's members . Resources can be defined along
many dimensions, including money, discretion, natural resources, hap-
piness, information, and power. Early social psychological research
on coalition behavior (e.g., Gamson, 1961; Vinacke and Arkoff, 1957)
defined resources as votes: research participants played the role of
the leader of one of several political parties that differed in mem-
bership size; the different party leaders controlled differing numbers
of votes. These were their resources. Unfortunately, this political
analogy was taken no further: the parties had no philosophy or
mission (maybe that's realistic) and negotiated only on the basis of
the number of votes they held, the number of votes held by the other
party leaders, and the winning combinations. The most prevalent sce-
narios gave three players 4, 3 and 2 votes, respectively, with a
majority (5) being needed to secure a fixed prize. Results frequently
showed the formation of the 3-2 coalition (Chertkoff, 1970) although
some studies (Kelley and Arrowood, 1960; Psathas and Stryker, 1965)
suggested that these results were condition-specific. Recent research
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(e.g., Kravitz, 1981; Murnighan, 1978b) based on the suggestions of
more recent social psychological theories (Komorita, 1974; Komorita
and Chertkoff, 1973) studied groups larger than three and found that
resources defined as votes were not particularly critical in the
coalition formation process.
Roth (1978), however, found that resources that were not arbi-
trarily assigned did have an impact on coalition behavior. Effort,
ability, and need all may contribute to a group's resources in ways
that significantly influence subsequent negotiations. The underlying
notion of early equity-based coalition theories (Gamson, 1964), that
outcomes should be related to the inputs one contributes, does receive
support in some contexts. The moral of this story is that resources
are probably quite important in the formation of organizational coali-
tions, even though resources as originally conceptualized in early
experimental research have not been very important.
In any coalition situation, some group members are sufficiently
strong, if they coalesce, to determine the group's decisions or
actions. In most groups, any majority is effective in this way. When
different group members can contribute different amounts to a winning
coalition, unique combinations of group members can win. In the
coalition literature, a minimum winning coalition is one that will
no longer be winning if any of its members leaves the coalition. The
set of minimum winning coalitions defines the structure of the game
(Murnighan, 1982).
This structure reflects (1) the actors who can form the smallest
successful coalitions and (2) the payoffs each coalition can obtain.
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In early coalition research, especially studies based on the political
analogy, all winning coalitions received the same outcome. (Recent
research which has considered more complex situations (e.g., Miller,
1982; Fiorina and Plott, 1978) has varied the payoffs winning coali-
tions can receive.) When either of two actors were equally critical
in the formation of a coalition, the actor with fewer resources (even
when they were votes) held an advantage, because s/he was likely to
demand or accept a smaller portion of the coalitions' payoff. This
appears to be the only situation where resources defined as votes are
important: if two actors are interchangeable within a coalition, the
other coalition members will prefer the actor with fewer resources; as
a result, their own shares of the payoff should increase.
The notion of interchangeability is important: when all winning
coalitions obtain the same payoff and the game structure indicates
that two actors are interchangeable, the actor who appears to yield
the least power, hold the fewest resources, or exert the least force
has an advantage. This conclusion, often termed "strength is
weakness" prevails in only a small set of organizational situations:
when anyone will do, interchangeability favors those who appear weak.
Thus, a supervisor who needs some support for a new group strategy
will almost certainly attempt to convince the weakest, most agreeable
group member to concur. If the supervisor has sufficient legitimate
power (French and Raven, i960), the strategy may very well be imple-
mented (although a general lack of support may undercut the implemen-
tation process)
.
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More coalition situations, however, reinforce the truism that
strength is strength: holding more resources increases the likelihood
that an actor will be included in a winning coalition, the ability to
exert force may increase a coalition's payoff, and controlling unique
resources that are in general demand provides an actor with flexibil-
ity and bargaining strength (Komorita, 1977). When an actor holds
more resources than anyone else, s/he may be a critical coalition
member; indeed, in some situations no coalition will be effective
without the inclusion of this individual. This notion of criticality
(Murnighan and Vollrath, 1984) is similar to the concepts of central-
ity in discussions of organizational power (Hickson, et al. 1971)
and the ability to be pivotal in a coalition (Shapley and Shubik,
1954). Critical, central, pivotal organizational members are key
actors who often serve as chief executives, supervisors, or other
legitimate authorities who must necessarily agree with a decision
before it can be implemented.
In game theoretic terms, the coalition structure of a game where
one person must be included in every agreement is a veto game, with
the executive being the veto player. In a veto game, no prizes or
payoffs are obtained unless the veto player is a member of the winning
coalition. One or more other group members may also be necessary, but
the veto player is not interchangeable: s/he must be included in
every agreement, decision, or coalition.
Veto games are particularly appropriate as analogs for organiza-
tional coalition situations (Murnighan and Vollrath, 1984). Non-veto,
fixed payoff games provided the setting for a wealth of strategic
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interplay: in the 4-3-2 game, the members of the 3-2 coalition are
always tempted by the advances of the excluded player, 4; so, too, are
the members of the 4-2 coalition tempted by 3 as are the members of
4-3 by 2. The interactions resemble the circle in communication net-
works (Leavitt, 1951: Shaw, 1960). Veto games, on the other hand,
focus attention on the central figure or "leader", much like the wheel
network. Interactions occur systematically, to and from the veto
player. This is an altogether different dynamic, one that separates
the interactants into two categories: (1) veto player/leader/super-
visor and (2) all of the non-veto player/follower/subordinates.
Research on veto games (see Murnighan and Vollrath, 1984, for a
summary) indicates that leaders have more power when they have many
subordinates who are prevented from effectively communicating from one
another. Leaders who require the support of only a few of their
followers can follow the age-old strategy of divide and conquer: by
preventing a united mutiny of the followers, the leader can pursue
his/her own desired course of action. By isolating one or more subor-
dinates and recruiting them as allies, a leader mitigates the possibil-
ity of revolt. By non-systematically dropping one privileged
subject, and replacing him/her with another, afte r disunity is
established, a supervisor prohibits the revolution led by a powerful
underling (cf. Coleman, 1978; Murnighan, 1981) and further frac-
tionates the subordinate group.
A political example approximating this process occurs in the
current French Government. Francois Mitterrand was elected president
in 1981; his party won a majority in the French Parliament, leading to
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what could have been a completely Social Democratic cabinet. Instead,
Mitterrand invited the Communist party to join the Cabinet and the
Government. Mitterrand then began fulfilling a variety of campaign
promises, ostensibly with the support of the entire government. After
three years, the value of the French franc had fallen drastically, and
the French economy was not recovering from the recessions of the 70 r s
as swiftly as the economies of other western countries. In the spring
of 1984, Mitterrand changed many key cabinet members, essentially
removing the Communists. While they had been co-opted (Thompson and
McEwen, 1958) into at least partial responsibility for France's eco-
nomic problems (and had lost considerable popular support in the
process), the Communists were now without a voice in the government,
and any cyclical upsurge in the French economy could be attributed to
the new programs proposed by Mitterrand's Social Democrats.
In this example, Mitterrand established a large base of support
for clearly risky programs at the outset of his government. When the
plans did not overwhelmingly succeed, Mitterrand changed his support
structure, dropping the Communists from the cabinet and limiting their
credibility as an effective opponent. Mitterrand has another chance,
and if his current plans coincide with (even without causing) a re-
covery, the Social Democrats will again be able to command wide-ranging
support.
This analysis has stressed strategy, power and control, which is
only one way of viewing intraorganizational coalitions. Another ana-
lyzes effectiveness : an effective coalition will be able to insure its
own well-being by providing the resources that are critical for the
entire organization's survival and growth. The first approach is
hedonistic and pessimistic; the second can be humanistic and opti-
mistic. The ability to identify which is active within any organiza-
tion is difficult if not impossible. In fact, the analysis does not
change appreciably: only attributions about the causes of events
change. If a veto player has legitimate authority but few other bases
of power (French and Raven, 1960), a manipulative, Machiavellian stra-
tegy is required for personal security. If, on the other hand, a
leader possesses skills and talents or controls financial or natural
resources necessary for the organization's success, a more open,
straightforward strategy can emerge. Unfortunately, a very successful
Machiavellian may act in the first mode but may manipulate the
situation and appear to be acting in the second. Our analysis of the
French Government, then, could have just as easily used a different
approach, highlighting the unique array of attributes present in the
first and second cabinets and the need to expand or solidify one's
political base.
Although we have mentioned the process of coalition formation in
our discussion, most of our attention has focused on the structure of
a coalition situation and the effects of structure on outcomes.
Within this structure, the process has its own, necessarily dependent
effects. We now turn to examine this process in more detail.
The Process and i ts Consequences
The formation of a coalition begins with a first move: one actor
must approach another. This action determines much of what follows.
An actor dealing from strength often does not need to make the first
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move ; instead, the actor who cannot achieve what s/he desires
without assistance, without a coalition, must initiate action.
The consequences of this first move, and the weakness it typically
indicates, can be exemplified by the interactions of new faculty mem-
bers and book companies or their representatives. Graduate students
who have landed an academic job need books and generally prefer not to
spend money to obtain them. But they must make the initial move and
contact publishers: this accurately reflects their relatively weak
strategic position. After they are established with a university,
simply by being there, having an office, and being listed on the
school's faculty, publisher's representatives come to them. Now the
first move is by the company, and the new faculty member can negotiate
from a position of strength.
Operationally, the strength afforded the receiver of an offer
means that the offer must be better than one the same person might
have to send if s/he were the initiator of the potential partner-
ship. Thus, if one of two supervisors at the same level in an
organization's hierarchy proposes a coalition between them, the
originator must offer at least as much or more than s/he demands.
This dynamic operates for either of the supervisors: by initiating
coalition bargaining, you indicate that your dependence on the poten-
tial alliance is at least as great or greater than your potential
partner's. This dependence may not be objective: all that is
necessary is that some weakness or dependence be perceived. Thus
organizational members who are motivated toward action, and toward the
formation of coalitions, will pay for their restlessness.
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As an example, consider an experiment (Murnighan, 1978b) that
included a game with five interchangeable, equally powerful actors,
any three of whom could form a winning coalition. Early proposals
were quite close to equal divisions among three players (33 1/3%
each). After some experience with coalition bargaining, most of the
bargainers changed their strategies and consistently proposed
agreements giving them less than their two partners: offers of
30-35-35 were most frequent. Bargainers who continued to demand 33 1/3
were less attractive coalition partners: they necessarily offered
less and, by asking for more, appeared to be "demanding" bargainers, a
perception that does not generate receptiveness . Even less effective
were the bargainers who mistakenly overvalued themselves and demanded
more than 33 1/3, especially after everyone had experience with the
bargaining procedures.
The hierarchical equality of two supervisors, however, is unusual:
usually one of the two parties will control more critical resources,
more influence, or have more experience than the other. When in-
equality is perceived by the bargainers, differences in strength will
of course affect the value of the proposals. Nevertheless, the ini-
tiator in a negotiation sacrifices some strength unless s/he has
considerable information (cf. Yukl , 1974) concerning: (1) the costs
that a potential partner would incur if s/he did not joint this or
another coalition; (2) the benefits this potential partner can obtain
by forming this or another coalition; and (3) the possibility that
this potential partner can join another coalition. In addition, the
potential partner must be aware of all these costs and benefits:
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skepticism is often the response to offers that hope to convince a
potential partner with the message, "you need this". Indeed, the orig-
inator of a coalition might be forced to offer more than normal if
the potential partner is unaware of his/her own reward contingencies.
Having information about the contingencies impinging on others is
one type of resource or power that provides a coalition initiator with
the opportunity to shrink the range of possible negotiation outcomes
(cf. Walton and McKersie, 1965) and propose a division of rewards that
is more personnally beneficial, thus circumventing the typical disad-
vantage associated with initiating action. The "Let them come to me"
strategy, though, only works when an organizational member has con-
siderable power. As many social bargainers know, lonely weekends are
often the result of assuming that you are strong enough to use this
strategy. When this strategy works, however, it is very effective.
Like many strategic choices, then, waiting for a good offer is a low
probability-high outcome approach. According to Peters and Waterman
(1982), the "wait and see" strategy is not often used by very success-
ful organizational executives.
The First Pair
Coalition formation negotiations are open to many forces. From
one game theoretic point of view, the payoffs that any pair of
bargainers will eventually obtain, if they have only each other to
bargain with, are indeterminate: any outcome is possible. Our own
experiences suggest that two equal negotiators will split a payoff at
or close to 50-50. Indeed, several research studies (Nydegger and
Owen, 1975; Roth and Malouf, 1978; Roth, Malouf , and Murnighan, 1981;
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Roth and Murnighan, 1982) find just this result when the bargainers
have no information about each other's actual payoffs or when the
payoffs can be equalized by 50-50 splits.
But consider a situation where someone approached you and an
acquaintance (let's call her Alice) and said "If you and Alice can
decide how to divide $100,000 in 30 minutes, I am authorized to pay
you that amount". Certainly this* is a stroke of good fortune. If you
naturally turned to Alice and proposed that you split the money
equally, and she responded, "No, I should get $80,000", you would prob-
ably be quite surprised. But if she continued to demand $80,000 for
the entire 30 minutes, what would you do? A simple rational model
says that you should take the $20,000. Certainly you should wait
until the very last second before succumbing, but it is usually not in
your best interests to refuse $20,000.
Thus, any outcome is possible within dyadic interactions, although
several variables can affect the outcomes considerably. Roth and
Schoumaker (1984) have shown that, in situations like the example with
Alice, if a person has established an unswerving, consistent reputa-
tion as a tough bargainer, opponents who know this reputation often
(but not always) concede. (Occasionally, disagreements occurred, more
frequently than if the bargainers were discussing 50-50 agreements.)
Siegel and Fouraker (1960) also showed that, when one bargainer
has exceedingly high aspirations (e.g., Alice actually needed all of
the $80,000 so that her mother could have an emergency operation),
s/he bargained more toughly, obtained more from the negotiations but
also contributed to a greater frequency of disagreements.
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Finally Roth and his colleagues (Roth and Malouf , 1978; Roth,
Malouf and Murnighan, 1981; Roth and Murnighan, 1982) have
demonstrated the importance of information: knowing that your oppo-
nent will fare much better than you will if you reach a 50-50
agreement pushes you to bargain for more equal expected outcomes (see
footnote 1)
.
Most pertinent for the current issue is the effect of relaxing the
assumption that a pair of bargainers must negotiate only with each
other. In organizations, there are often a multitude of potential
coalition partners, some who can contribute quite a lot, others who
might only contribute a little to a coalition. The availability of
alternative partners can provide a negotiator with considerable
strength.
Komorita's models of coalition behavior, Bargaining Theory
(Komorita and Chertkoff, 1973), the Weighted Probability Model
(Komorita, 1974), and Equal Excess Theory (Komorita, 1979) focus
directly on the effect of alternatives on a bargainer's strength. The
Weighted Probability Model emphasizes the number or quantity of the
available alternatives; Bargaining Theory and Equal Excess Theory
emphasize the quality of the available alternatives. As Bargaining
Theory has been a better predictor of coalition behavior in recent
research (Kravitz, 1981; Murnighan, 1978b) the quality of another
potential partner seems to provide a bargainer with more strength than
the number of potential partners. (Other situations than those con-
sidered in these experiments may, of course, alter this conclusion).
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Bargaining Theory also stresses that the credibility of a high
quality alternative is important. If a negotiator can convince a
potential partner that his/her alternative partners are exceptional,
these alternatives will be influential in the current bargaining.
Thus, if one aspiring young executive can convince a peer that s/he
could form a coalition with an influential superior in the firm, and
the peer believes this is a distinct possibility, then this possible
alternative provides the young executive with strength - more strength
than s/he might have if s/he were bargaining with the superior and
used the peer as an alternative.
In negotiations, then, alternatives function as threats. In
Ellsberg's (1959) terms, credible threats (alternatives) can be used
to coerce, deter, or blackmail. Negotiating the formation of an orga-
nizational coalition certainly involves give and take, even in social,
informal, friendly coalitions. Threats, which often remain implicit,
are an integral element of this process.
Expanding from a Pair
Negotiations, especially between the initial members of a coali-
tion, are not often clearcut, tooth-and-nail bargaining sessions. But
even with considerable uncertainty, bargaining must address: (1)
assigning responsibility for upcoming action; (2) deciding what those
actions will be; and (3) determining how payoffs will be divided, if
only in limited ways. Informal, social coalitions often proceed on
the basis of individually held, unshared assumptions of what will hap-
pen. Without a shared experience, e.g., a previous history of
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interaction, two "partners" may have little idea of each other's
expectations (cf. Bettenhausen and Murnighan, 1985).
Frequently, the original coalition members try to recruit addi-
tional members. This expansion process differs considerably from the
process of first contacts. Subsequent negotiations continue to be
primarily dyadic, but now the already committed coalition member can
negotiate on the basis of the coalition's combined resources. As
coalitions form, resources accumulate : an original member can discuss
how much "we" control, rather than relying solely on his/her own
resources. An early coalition partner expands the mutual power base
and allows all of the initial members to negotiate from increased
strength. The fact that they are approaching another individual con-
veys their dependence or desire for this potentially new member, as
before. Nevertheless, as a team, two individuals can often provide
more as partners than either could provide individually.
Exceptions to this rule occur when the third person in the nego-
tiations is individually stronger than either of the original two.
S/he may prefer to have joined earlier when his/her inherent
superiority could have been used to exert more control. Indeed, the
coalition allows the two originally weaker members to negotiate with a
stronger group member on a much more equal basis than they could if
either of them had approached the stronger individual first.
When the marginal benefits provided by additional members are no
longer perceived as exceeding the costs involved in expansion, the
coalition will recruit no more. Excluded individuals may petition to
join, however by showing that they can enhance the current coalition
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raerabers' benefits without appreciably increasing coordination or other
costs. Indeed, the power a coalition generates for its members is
often very attractive to outsiders.
Group Meetings
This conceptualization of the organizational coalition formation
process does not depend on the coalition members meeting as a group.
Indeed group meetings, in this conceptualization, are primarily
ritualistic . The members of an organizational coalition generally act
collectively in a group meeting only if a decision or action relates
to the reason for their formation. The point here is simply that
coalitions do not form in group meetings . Negotiations among poten-
tial coalition members and individuals who will eventually be excluded
from the coalition are too sensitive for open, face-to-face discussion
in large groups. More private, one-to-one discussions are the basis,
then, for most organizational coalitions, and must precede large orga-
nizational meetings.
Group meetings, on the other hand, often function as a stage where
coalitions that have already formed make their debut. Non-members may
have no idea that a coalition has formed, and the revelation of an
agreeing, seemingly united form can be a considerable surprise. Our
original examples of two vice-presidents coordinating their budget
requests may lead the third to wonder how the other two can be in
such concerted agreement on almost every issue. Similarly, the secre-
tary who was left out of the birthday celebration coalition may agree
that a party was a good idea, but may continue to implement her own
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individual plans for the celebrant. And the excluded members in the
work team may be particularly angry that their preferences for work
procedures were not considered. In each case, the excluded members
may have had only the faintest inclination that strategic negotiations
were proceeding without them, prior to a group meeting. Indeed, many
coalitions, either by design or by fortuitous circumstance, are dif-
ficult to clearly identify. Much like the strategy of a student who
cheats on an exam but makes sure that s/he does not answer every
question correctly, a successful coalition that does not seem united
may appear less obvious, less clear, and therefore less open to retal-
iation by non-members.
Fortuitous Coalitions
This entire discussion has focused on purposive coalitions: an
issue becomes relevant for two or more people and they decide to act
together to resolve it. The underlying assumptions of coalition
theories match this approach, as we have mentioned. Some organiza-
tional theorists (e.g., March and Cohen, 1972), on the other hand,
would object to this conceptualization; indeed, organizational members
may not have sufficient time to coalesce purposefully. Some organiza-
tional coalitions, then probably, form fortuitously: two or more
individuals may discover that they have mutual interests that could be
better served by concerted action. The first indication of these
common interests may result when they find themselves working individ-
ually, in parallel, on the same issue. By simply reducing the dupli-
cation of their efforts, they gain.
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Fortuitous coalitions often find that their initial common
interest may correlate with other interests, providing the basis for
more than a short term union. Indeed, purposive coalitions may not
always be short term: they, too, can capitalize on a series of common
interests. The longevity of an organizational coalition, though,
depends to a great extent on its size: as a coalition grows, the
likelihood of all of its members agreeing on a wide range of issues
becomes smaller and smaller. Organizational coalitions, then might be
conceptualized as fluid groups, with a quorum of any of the members
necessary for its continued existence. The problem with this concep-
tualization is that it ignores the diversity of resources, which are
sometimes conflicting, held by different coalition members; it also
deflates and further diffuses the concept of an organizational coali-
tion.
Our conception of organizational coalitions, then, focuses on
short-term, informal, fragmented collectives whose interests coincide
sufficiently for common action on a small number of issues . This
approach unfortunately does not provide easy access to the researcher
interested in documenting organizational coalitions. Rather, it pro-
vides signs and cues that can increase our understanding of interorga-
nizational dynamics. The executive vice president who was excluded
from preliminary budget negotiations, for instance, should not
necessarily expect that his/her two colleagues will act in concert on
all of the upcoming issues that concern the three of them.
Organizational coalitions may be so brief that concepts like loyalty
and defection must be established very quickly, if at all. Indeed,
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defectiort from a coalition presupposes a possibly unrealistic foun-
dation (cf. Murnighan, 1981), one often based on implicit understand-
ings. As a result, organizational actors who cope effectively with
complex internal environments are likely to be those who do not depend
on the stability of organizational coalitions (or the stability of the
organization)
.
This viewpoint is decidedly pessimistic. The theoretical foun-
dation for our approach, of course, is coolly calculating and
rational: its translation to organization has retained this outlook.
Nevertheless, as a cautionary word, humanism, altruism, sincerity, and
ethical conduct are not without their place in organizational coali-
tions. In pessimistic, rational environments, coalitions may require
members who are humanistic, optimistic, and/or emotional, even for
their short-term survival. As years of research on interpersonal
interaction in organizations (e.g., Stogdill, 1974) has shown, an
impersonal approach will not always be effective. With no information
to the contrary, we optimistically assume that humanity is just as
important within organizational coalitions.
Dominant Coalitions
Finally we return to the concept of coalitions that is most fre-
quently used in organizational theory, the dominant coalition. Our
discussion suggests that, instead of a unique group of powerful indi-
viduals forming a single, powerful- coalition, organizational actions
are more often determined by one or another of several dominant
coalitions
,
whose membership changes are frequent. Indeed, because
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organizational issues are not governed by the same clock, several
dominant coalitions are likely to exist simultaneously.
These powerful groups almost necessarily overlap: an individual's
power within an organization depends to a great extent, then, on the
number of dominant coalitions s/he joins (cf. Hickson, et al., 1971;
Murnighan, 1982). If, as we have argued, autocratic action by a
single individual is unlikely, then coalitions are necessary and power
should derive from multiple memberships in the set of dominant coali-
tions within an organization.
According to this thesis the key to power in organizations is the
accumulation of resources that are critical to the functioning of the
organization's dominant coalitions. Many memberships and a well-
placed position in each important coalition are sure signs of an
individual's power.
Few if any organizational members will participate in every impor-
tant organizational coalition (Murnighan, 1985). The aspiring execu-
tive, then, faces a difficult paradox: increasing your inclusions in
dominant coalitions without alienating people who might initiate other
important coalitions. How this can be accomplished is more than can
be addressed here.
Nevertheless, the competitions inherent in succession and promo-
tion can be conceptualized as a long-term process whereby upwardly
mobile organizational members become increasingly included within the
organization's dominant coalitions. Being privy to and influential in
the organization's key decisions on an ever increasing basis is not
only an indicator of likely future advancement, but also documents the
-25-
successes of the effective dominant coalitions member. Because there
are few singularly critical organizational decisions, the variety of
important decisions made within any organization depends on a variety
of dominant coalitions. Those few members who include themselves most
frequently in these informal, often transitory, but never powerless
groups, are those who comprise Thompson's (1967) "inner circle", if
one exists. But even as elite members of such a set, the inner circle
may never meet, but merely exist as our own analytical label of the
center of an organization's power and resources.
Simply, then, the suggestions included in this paper provide a
basis for organizational observers to more accurately document the
coalition formation process and for organizational members to build
strategic foundations for coalition formation.
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Footnotes
1. In the series of studies by Roth and his colleagues, bargainers
negotiated for chances in a lottery, with 100% being available.
Agreements of 50% - 50% could be reached, but the potential prizes the
bargainers received if they won their lottery were not necessarily
identical. In Roth and Murnighan (1982), for instance, if one
bargainer won his/her lottery, the prize was $20 while the other's
best outcome was only $5.
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